

# *Turkey and the EU: The Challenges Ahead*

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## TURKEY AND THE EU: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

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*In loving memory of my father...*

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## Chapter 7

# Does History Repeat Itself? Turkey's Contemporary Relations with the EU and US from a Retrospective Perspective

Efe SIVIŞ

The aim of this chapter is to analyse Turkey's relations with EU and US to make sense of contemporary relations from a retrospective point of view. In that regard the research question tackles on Turkey's main motivations at two historical events that are vital for Turkey's political life. Considering the course of relations from past to today, the chapter questions a continuity in terms of Turkey's motivations in association with EU and US.

The scope of the chapter covers two historical milestones for Turkey's relations with the Western world and contemporary state of relations with EU and US. The first incident is root-cause of Turkey – US alliance which leans on 1946 when Turkey transited to multi-party regime after World War Two. Following 23 years of one-party rule, the motivations of Turkey's decision-makers in moving towards democratization at the time is analysed. The second incident is the application of Turkey to the EEC in

1959 which may be considered as the starting point of Turkey-EU relations. While it points to Turkey's long journey towards EU membership, the chapter examines Turkey's motivations behind its application and the conditions that led to take such step towards a newly established international organization.

In view of the two mentioned milestones, the chapter is divided into six sections, where Turkey's relations with the EU and US are analysed chronologically. It starts by dealing with Turkey's modernization tendencies in relation with the Western world since the Ottoman period. The developments that caused the modernization process at the end of 18<sup>th</sup> century are discussed to give a historical background. In the second section, a theoretical framework is drawn to have an analytical understanding of how decision makers at the time conducted cost-benefit analysis under particular circumstances. The third section focuses on Turkey's main motivations in transition to a multi-party system in relation with US, while the fourth considers Turkey's application to the European Economic Community (EEC) for association. In the forthcoming sections Turkey's contemporary relations with EU and US are discussed and compared with previous outcomes. The aim of the comparison is to reveal a pattern in terms of motivations that activated the relations of the time and today. In conclusion, the findings of the chapter are discussed and the research question is analysed by showing continuity of characteristics in Turkey's relations with the EU and US.

### Turkey's Modernization Process

From the end of the 18th century onwards, the Ottoman Empire's distinct fall against European states, had been an important trigger for Turkish modernization (Zürcher, 2004, p. 9). The economic depression with the increasing number of military defeats and territorial losses directed the Ottoman political elites to mull over the million-dollar question: "What went wrong?"

The European states maintained their political stability after getting through certain processes such as Reform, Renaissance, and Industrial Revolution whereas Ottomans were in a constant regression that was just a signal flare of ultimate dissolution. Ottomans adopted a series of reforms in order to overcome confronted difficulties. The first realm of reforms was implemented in the military. Based upon Europe's political and economic development, Ottomans imported various experts to improve its military institutions (Berkes, 1998, pp. 31-32). The Nizam-i Djedid reforms started by Ottoman Sultan Selim III aimed at introducing discipline and science into Janissary Corps. However resistance from the army, *ulema* (religious scholars) and local authorities prevented Ottomans to accomplish the set goals (Tucker, 2016, p. 57).

After Selim, Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II intended to adopt stream of reforms targeting to expand the reformation from military to economic and political realms. Taking a leaf out of European's book, influenced by its centralized State character, Ottomans initiated to diminish the strength of its local elites. Abolishment of Janissary Corps, tempering the influence of religious scholars were remarkable acquisitions for Sultanate at the time. Besides, the state administration partially shifted from Sultan's

authority to bureaucracy. The establishment of new educational institutions independent from religious scholars are worthy of note (Anscombe, 2010). Sending Ottoman students to Western countries where they got exposed to positivist and rationalist schools had a serious impact on Empire's and 1923 onwards on its successor's future (Berkes, 1998, p. 361).

The Committee Union and Progress who de facto ruled the Empire on its own between 1913 and 1918 perpetuated the secularizing reforms in judicial and educational systems. Additionally the Committee provided particular rights to women (Tucker, 2016, p. 119). While the *fetva* department, *Meşihat* started to interpret Islam considering the necessities of the contemporary era, Shaykh al-Islam (Şeyhülislam), the chief religious official in Ottoman was removed from cabinet and courts were given to the authority of Justice Representation, (*Adalet Vekaleti*) after 1916. Thereby the religious institutions lost much of its authority in legislative and judicial realms (Ardic, 2012, pp. 184-186).

Following Ottomans defeats in WWI, occupation of its lands gave rise to a national struggle. Turkish uprising led by a former Union and Progress Committee member Mustafa Kemal ended up with success in favour of Turks (Zürcher, 2004, pp. 133-166). A true secularist personality, Mustafa Kemal accomplished to abolish sultanate in 1922 where he limited the political and secular authority of caliphate simultaneously. After the proclamation of Republic in 1923, where a strong President was residing in Ankara, caliphate's presence in Istanbul was a discomfoting circumstance for political elites of new Turkey, mainly the President himself Mustafa Kemal. The caliphate was abolished in 1924 which meant a concrete disengagement with Muslim World (Berkes, 1998, p. 450). Consistently, the top of *Ulema*, Shaykh al-Islam office which had been regarded as an ankle bracelet by particular circles since the *Tanzimat* era was abrogated along with Ministry of Religious Law and Pious Endowments, (*Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti*) which was regulatory of the religious affairs. Instead a new institution, Directory of Religious Affairs was established based on Hannafiyah school of Islam to sustain control in religious life (Lewis, 1961, p. 407).

Mustafa Kemal and his associates, after laying the groundwork of legal base with 1924 Constitution, started to put successive secular reforms into practice until 1928 such as adoption of new civil code, replacement of fez with hat, change of public holiday from Friday to Sunday, adoption of Gregorian instead of the Hijri calendar, and replacement of Arabic with Latin alphabet. The reforms refer to an intention of breaking societies' bonds with Islam and Ottoman Empire. The statement that claims the religion of state as Islam was removed from the Constitution and ultimately the principle of secularism was inserted instead (Zürcher, 2004, pp. 166-206). Moreover, the founder of modern Turkey, Ataturk put a target for the country to reach to the level of contemporary civilization. No doubt that he implied Western civilization (Kinross, 1964).

The modernization process of Turkey that also perpetuated after Ataturk's death in 1938, has been a controversial issue in academia. From the beginning of

the process there have been various debates whether the process is accomplished by the free will of local political elites or it is enforced by outsider actors, namely by Western powers. Hence the two historical events that carry much weight in contemporary Turkish politics need further explanation within this context; Turkey's transition to multi-party system in 1946 and its application to European Economic Community for association in 1959.

### Cost-Benefit Analysis of Political Elites in Democratization Decisions

Though domestic politics and international relations are usually entangled, the theories in the discipline fall into error of neglecting this concrete fact (Putnam, 1988, p. 431). Since the domestic politics and international relations are two independent context, both of them are rarely used in explaining developments in one of the mentioned two (Moravcsik, 1993).

For a country that is exempted from direct pressures of any outsider factor, Robert Dahl's democratic transition model may be benignant. His approach is based on 'internal cost of suppression' and 'internal cost of toleration'. If an authoritarian administration is convinced that the cost of suppression exceeds the cost of toleration than it takes the decision of transition to democracy (Dahl, 1971). Though the model is applicable for the countries that are free of international impacts, it may not be adequate for countries that are open to such impacts. Accordingly, an authoritarian regime makes a cost-benefit analysis by considering cost of pressure and cost of toleration only before its own people.

The need of a model for a country that is open to international impacts was met by another scholar at a relatively later date. The 'new' model foresees that a regime that is open to international impacts is not expected to transit democracy by its own will. In addition to what Dahl had proposed such regime would probably get subjected to two new constraints; 'expected external cost of suppression' and 'expected external cost of toleration' (Yilmaz, 2002, p. 11). If the external powers are in favour of democracy than the 'expected external cost of suppression' may assumed as zero. Likewise in an international atmosphere that favour democracy, talking about 'external cost of toleration' would not make sense where instead 'expected external benefits of toleration (or democratization)' may be used. Those benefits could be financial assistance to the country that transits to democracy, pro bono military aids, joining to international organizations and increase its prestige level in the international arena. Under such circumstances that favour democracy, an authoritarian government would make a twofold cost-benefit analysis that are the 'external cost of suppression' and 'internal cost of toleration.' If an authoritarian administration comes to a conclusion that the 'internal cost of tolerance' exceeds the 'external cost of pressure', then it would not take a step towards democratization.

Theorist	Government Model	Cost & Benefit Analysis Level				
		Robert Dahl	Authoritarian Regime Free of International Impacts	Internal Cost of Suppression before People		Internal Cost of Toleration before People
Hakan Yilmaz	Authoritarian Regime Subject to International Impacts	Internal Cost of Suppression before People	Internal Cost of Toleration before People	Expected External Cost of Suppression before International Arena	Expected External Cost of Toleration before International Arena / Expected External Benefits before International Arena	

### First Step to Democracy: Turkey's Transition to Multi-Party System

An important motivation of Turkey in transition to multiparty regime lies in relations with its 'big neighbour'. Soviet Union was an important figure in Turkish foreign policy during the 1920s and 1930s. It was the Russians who recognized Mustafa Kemal Government for the first time by signing the 1921 Moscow treaty. In 1925, a friendship pact was signed between the two, whose duration was set as 20 years that coincides with the end of WW II. Turkey's position since the proclamation of Republic was somehow neutral in accordance with Ataturk's "peace at home, peace in the World" foreign policy principle. However Soviet demands from Turkey after the WW II, gave rise to Turkey's relations with the Anglo-Saxon Western World, mainly with USA and Great Britain.

The cat came out of the bag in 19 March 1945 when the Soviet foreign minister informed Turkish ambassador to Moscow about Soviet demands. First demand was the revision of the border between Turkey and USSR that was established by 1921 Moscow agreement, meaning to leave Turkey's eastern cities of Kars and Ardahan to Soviets. Second one was having an army and naval base in the region to defend the Straits together with Turkey. The request also involves a revision of multilateral Montreux Convention and signing of a new treaty only between Turkey and Soviets instead. Turkish Ambassador at the time refused Soviet demands without asking Ankara (*Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl*, 1973, pp. 264-267).

When Soviet demands came to light, Turkish Foreign Ministry endeavoured to strengthen its relations with Western countries particularly with US and Britain. Following a period of neutrality, US supported Turkey's stand. According to transmitted message to Washington from US ambassador to Ankara at late 1945, Soviets would intervene Turkey by Spring of 1946 after consolidating their position in Iran (NARA-867, 19.12.1945). In 24th September 1946 a diplomatic note was sent to Tur-

key repeating the same demand of 19 March 1945. Unlike the previous notes, it was only sent to Turkey without informing US Secretary of State who replied the note in refusing the demands of common defence of Straits (Armaoğlu, 1991, pp. 150-152).

With the passing of time while US seems to be convinced regarding Soviet threats, ironically Turkey's foreign ministry officials' perception of threat somehow diminished. The foreign minister official Feridun Erkin, in his private conversation with US ambassador to Ankara, concluded that while Soviets are engaged with peace treaty discussions, Communizing Germany, consolidating position in Iran, plans for Manchuria; Turkey would not expect a new Soviet propaganda attack (NARA-867, 15.07.1946). This archive document is remarkable due to its date which was just before the first direct multi-party elections held in Turkey's history. Although Turkish bureaucrats seem to be underestimating the Soviet threats in time, accomplishment of elections can be concluded as Turkey's concerns were not fully eliminated.

Turkey's worsened relations with Soviets directed Turkey to apply pro-American policies. Soviets by forming a threat towards Turkey, unconsciously canalized the latter with Western democracies. The foreign minister at the time Molotov, who informed Turkish ambassador about Soviet demands, later in his memoirs admitted that their policy was a mistake due to its consequences (Chuev, 1993).

Recall that Soviet demands came in sight at 19 March 1945 just before the United Nations' formation conference in 25 April. Although Turkey has fulfilled the pre-condition of joining the organization by declaring war against Japan and Germany, President Inonu seemed to be concerned regarding Americans possible questioning of one-party regime type in Turkey. In such case, he gave a brief to the Foreign Minister before his departure to San Francisco concerning his intention of consolidating Atatürk's reform and maintain a full scale democracy which he could not accomplish due to war atmosphere (Ünal, 1994)

Turkey's other motivation in transition to multi-party system was economy. In need of financial help, US was the only potential source that could assist Turkey. After war, it was Turkey who asked of 500 million USD credit from US in 1945 to be used in industrial development and infrastructure projects where US offered with USD 25 million. Although did not cause any change, US Ambassador to Ankara at the time advised Washington to enhance the offered amount for various reasons such as reflecting determinacy in supporting Turkey against Soviets and assisting Turkey to make economic infrastructural readjustments (Çetiner, 2014, pp. 184-185; FRUS, 07.12.1946). In sum, between 1945 and 1946, Turkey got three loans: USD 3.060 million in September 1945, 25 million in July 1946 and an additional 10 million as a surplus credit in May 1946. Nevertheless, Turkey's strive for US aids was apparent at the time. Next year in 1947, US Congress approved President Truman's proposal of USD 400 million military aid to Turkey and Greece, known as Truman Doctrine. Turkey's share of amount was 100 million due to Greece's critical situation of civil war within the country.

Considering the democratization model of Yilmaz, although there was no direct pressure from outside, the decision maker at the time, President Inonu took a step to-

wards democratization due to his cost-benefit analysis. The expected external benefits of democratization were non-negligible because Turkey intended to receive financial aids from US and set his foreign policy goal to be part of Western Block after the WW II due to Soviet threats, economic needs and traditional modernization aspect mentioned in the first section. Meanwhile the external cost of suppression would be immeasurable in case of Western Block not giving support to Turkey against Soviets. Under such circumstances, President Inonu should have calculated the possibility of Soviet occupation of Straits, Kars, Ardahan without meeting any serious difficulty.

On the other hand, the internal cost of toleration from the perspective of one-party government would mean a multi-party system where CHP may perpetuate its tutelage over the political life and compete with relatively weak new-born opposition. It may be argued that Inonu government did not foresee Turkey's transition to multiparty system would ultimately overthrow CHP. Thus the internal cost of toleration remained relatively small *vis-à-vis* expected external cost of suppression. Coherently in case of democratization, the expected external benefits of democratization were appetizing for President Inonu. However, it did not take so long that he realized he was mistaken. In the first general elections held in 21 July 1946 CHP leaders seem to be surprised by the success of Democratic Party. The US diplomatic mission in Turkey was inclined to view that CHP did make a manipulation for Inonu to get elected in Ankara otherwise he would be eliminated by the Democratic Party candidate (NARA-867, 19.08.1946). In the general elections of 1950, a one-way ticket to democracy found an expression where CHP was overthrown and DP's long journey of one party rule had started.

#### **Starting Point of the 'Unfinished Symphony': Origins of Turkey – EU Relations**

In the general elections held in 1950, Democratic Party took over the rule from CHP who had been ruling the country since 1923. The main difference between the party platforms of DP and CHP was not on politics but rather on economy. Contrary to the rigid 'statism' principle of CHP, DP leaders favoured a private capital and enterprise in economic life. Even right after the formation process of the party, US ambassador to Ankara at the time informed Washington that the main difference between DP from CHP would be economy (NARA-867, 22.01.1946). Consistently, the plights of DP leaders promised more liberalized economic relations with foreign actors. As pledged, after coming to rule, DP adopted a law that encouraged foreign investments. Besides, in 1950, DP fulfilled the criteria of European Payments Union that involves liberation of 60% of trade volume among the member countries (Hale, 1981).

The international situation was also in favour of Turkey's economic liberation attempts. The Korean War raised the global prices including the agricultural products. Since Turkey was one of the biggest wheat exporters at the time, the GNP of the country increased with an average of %9 between 1950 and 1954. Accordingly, Marshall Aid that was assisted by US was mostly encouraged agricultural activities. The number of tractors in the mentioned years increased by %134 and the growth in agriculture sector was %7 (Altunışık & Tür, 2005, p. 72; Takım, 2012).

The liberation showed its effect not only in exports. The imports of Turkey in the mentioned period exceeded Turkey's export volume which ended up a considerable budget deficit. The DP government tried to conform the budget deficit by adopting various restrictions on imports. After 1954, in DP's second term, the economic problems remained. The slowdown in rising trend of arable lands, inability of importing spare parts of agricultural equipment due to lack of foreign currency, relatively bad weather conditions compared to 50-54 period ended up to a considerable drop in growth rate of agricultural sector with 7% to 1.6%. Moreover, unplanned investments caused considerable public sector deficit that ultimately triggered inflation. Between 1954 and 1958, the price levels increased by approximately 90% (Singer, 1977).

Since DP leaders resisted to stabilization advice from institutions such as OEEC, IMF and IBRD, the amount of credits supplied to Turkey dramatically decreased. Turkey's fore coming financial creditor US, also stipulated such advises as prerequisite to perpetuate its financial assistance. DP leaders did not give an inch to coming advices due to possible negative effects of austerity measures among the people. In such atmosphere DP preferred to advance the general elections in 1957 and received 48% of the popular vote while gaining 70% of the total seats thanks to the election system. In 1958 DP government had to sign a stand-by treaty with IMF followed by an extra credit of 359 million USD from OECD. Moreover a drastic devaluation followed which decreased value of Turkish lira from 2.80 to 9.00 with respect to USD (Krueger, 1974; Zürcher, 2004, pp. 239-240).

When the Treaty of Rome was signed among the founding six members to form the European Economic Community in 1957, there is no sign that Turkey showed any interest. Back then there were two competing trade groups in Europe: 'sixes' which refers to founding members of EEC and 'sevens' that points to potential members of EFTA ultimately established in 1960. A third group was made up of countries that was neither a part of any side such as Turkey, Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Finland and Spain (Dedman, 2009, p. 97)

Among the members of the third group, Turkey was highly sensitive on Greek policies due to the fact that Greek participation to sixes or sevens may endanger Turkish trading interests. The object of struggle among the two countries, Cyprus affair settled amicably in 1959 by Zurich and London agreements. The two parties reached a consensus on taking common action towards EEC during Greek Prime Minister's visit to Turkey (Çakır, 2010).

Upon receiving the news of Greece's application to EEC for association, considerable concern among the political elites of Turkey got out (Birand, 2005; Erhan & Arat, 2001, pp. 814-816). EEC area was used to be Turkey's traditional export market. In case of Greece becoming a member where Turkey is not, would mean a considerable burden for Turkey's trading activities. On the other hand, Turkey's choice of EEC rather than EFTA lies in the fact that Turkey's trade volume with the former was much higher. Economically, Turkey was not in a position to join the EEC at once, however it was concluded that in the long run it would be beneficial. Therefore Turkey applied EEC for association in 31 July 1959 after informing its allies; NATO and US and having their confirmation (Birand, 2005).

## Contemporary Turkey – EU Relations in the Light of Its Root Causes

Since the Ankara Agreement signed in 1963, Turkey – EU relations has been lasting with a fluctuating course. Turkey was granted candidate status in 1999 and full membership negotiations started in 2005 after adopting successive reforms between 2001 and 2005. Meanwhile, Turkey has been a member of Customs Union since 1996. As analysed in previous section, the historical motivation of Turkey towards EU seemed to be mostly economic rather than political. When it comes to contemporary Turkey-EU relations the economic element still preserves its prior position between the two. Turkey's export volume to 28 members of EU in 2015 was USD 68.5 billion followed by Middle East region with 35.4 billion. Aside, a possible implementation of Brexit decision may change the value but not the sorting. Turkey's export share to EU was 44.5 % in 2015 where Middle and Near East was 21.6 % (İhracatın Yılları İçindeki Gelişimi 2001-2015, 2015). Similarly, EU is at the top of Turkey's import list with USD 78.7 billion. Its share in Turkey's total import volume is 38% whereas the share of closest follower Middle/Near East is 6.6% with 13.6 billion.

2013 onwards recent increase in foreign trade between EU and Turkey can be explained through various reasons. EU's overcoming of 2008 global crisis in time had an increasing effect on Turkey's export figures. Secondly Turkey's trade volume with near and neighbour countries have been decreasing due to worsening of bilateral relations and extraordinary conditions. Thirdly, owing to decrease in oil prices, the income of Russia and oil-exporting countries were relatively shrinking which had a negative effect in their trading capacities. Thereby Turkey's trade volume with EU was enhanced from 36.9% in 2012 to 40.6% in 2015 (İhracatın Yılları İçindeki Gelişimi 2001-2015, 2015).

Consistent with Turkey's historical motivations, its relations with EU are having a firm basis in economic terms. However, in political aspect the relations are not underwhelming. Though full-membership negotiations started, Turkey faces various limitations in opening particular chapters due to assumed Cyprus issue. Among 35 chapters there has been only one temporarily closed while 8 of them remained to be opened due to Turkey's failure in applying Additional Protocol to Cyprus. 6 chapters were directly blocked by Cyprus whereas negotiations are still pending in 15 chapters. Considering the course of negotiations, it seems difficult for Turkey to finalize the accession talks in near future. Even in such case, there is much doubt that the member countries would approve Turkey's membership in European Council. The extreme rightist movements seem to be on the rise not only around Europe but also in US. The Brexit plebiscite in 2016, relative success of UKIP in 2015 general elections in Britain, considerable increase in electoral and public support for Marine Le Pen's National Front in France play along with the results of 2016 US Presidential elections. While it seems difficult for Turkey to go to any lengths, it is controversial whether former Prime Minister of Britain's statement<sup>53</sup> is an example of wishful thinking or a cold fact.

<sup>53</sup> During the Brexit campaign, David Cameron's efforts to appease British people concerning Turkey's accession to EU; "Turkey is on course to join the European Union in the year 3000 on its current rate of progress" (Hughes, 22.05.2016).

## 'Scar of History' in Contemporary Turkey – US Relations

As mentioned in the section of Turkey's transition to multi-party system, US has been the foremost ally for Turkey since the end of the WW II. The historical motivations of Turkey's rapprochement to US were two fold; security and economy. However, from a retrospective point of view, the course of relations with the US was not very stable during that time. President Johnson's letter in 1965 to Prime Minister Inonu in a dictating mood to prevent any intervention in Cyprus, US pressures on Turkey to ban the plantation of opium 1965 onwards, US arms embargo in 1975 on Turkey due to Cyprus intervention and opium affair, Turkey's rejection of permission to base US troops on Turkish soil during Iraq war in 2003 have been the core elements of rough times in the relations of the two. While it is observed that the apple of discord was mostly related to security affairs, the contemporary relations are not exempted from the historical trend.

At this stage, the relations seem to preserve their historical motivations; economy and security. The primary issues in Turkey-US relations regarding security have two dimensions. Suspected leader of 15 July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, keeps residing in US despite of ruling JDP Government's strong demands for his return. Meanwhile, the Syria affair where a civil war is present since 2011 is on the table. US continues to co-operate with the Kurdish forces YPG against ISIS, although Turkey views the former as an extension of outlawed PKK. Meanwhile US tenaciously refrains from Turkey's proposal of forming a safe zone to place the Syrian refugees. Despite of Turkey's dissatisfaction with two terms of Obama's policies particularly regarding Middle East, the state of affairs during the term of President-elect Donald Trump are almost unforeseen.

In regard to other historical motivation; economy, the financial activities perpetuate with a certain extent. However, the transactions between the two is a mere flea when compared to trading activities with EU countries. For 2015, US sorting in Turkey's export list is 5th with USD 6.4 billion whereas Turkey's imports from US worth of 11.13 billion account for 5.4% of its total imports. With the result that Turkey's trade volume with 508 million inhabitants of EU is USD 147.2 billion whereas its overall activities with US of 325 million inhabitants constitute 17.13 billion (*Ekonomi ve Dış Ticaret Raporu*, 2016).

The figures seem consistent with historical motivations in Turkey's relations with EU and US. While the starting point of the affairs with EU was mostly based on economy, when it comes to US, security took priority followed by economy. Under the contemporary circumstances, after nearly 60 years one can led to the conclusion that the characteristic of the relations for both did not undergo a dramatic change. Turkey though continuing the full membership negotiations with EU there is no sign to see the light at the end of the tunnel besides most of the chapters are frozen. Meanwhile the trading activities of the two, confirms its strong foundation which is reflected in the figures. On the other hand, today in Turkey-US relations, though not in the exactly same manner as it was in 1946, security concern keeps its place on the top, followed by relatively lesser economic affairs.

## Conclusion

Since the 18th century, the cost-benefit analysis made by the decision makers has been leading the modernization process of Turkey. As a matter of course, the international relations, domestic politics have an impact on such decisions. Regarding the transition to a multi-party system and application to the EEC for association, Turkey's relations with the Western World may not be defined as shaped via direct pressure of outsider factors. The decision makers of Turkey at the time moved the country towards a multi-party regime and conducting relations with the EEC. The main motivations behind the decisions were security and economy. Particularly, the transition to a multi-party system decision aimed at developing relations with US on security and economy axis. Meanwhile, the key element for association application to EEC was an economic one.

The findings of the research that was conducted with the aim of understanding contemporary relations of Turkey with the EU and US from a retrospective perspective claim that the main motivations behind the mentioned decisions were security and economic concerns. By examining two critical incidents of Turkey's political life, the chapter argues to reveal a continuity in characteristics of the relations. From past to today, these historical motivations seem to preserve their weights under existing circumstances.

Particularly, Turkey's transition to a multi-party system in 1946, aimed at developing relations with US on security-wise and economically. After WW II, Soviet demands, including annexation of Turkey's soil and base in the Straits, caused considerable concern in Turkey. Although Turkey's officials declared that the Turkish army would resist in case of any Soviet intervention, it was obvious that the strength of both countries was disproportionate in favour of Russians. It is doubtful whether Turkey was ready to take such a risk. Thereby, security concerns could be explanatory in Turkey's rapprochement to the US at the time.

A lesser motivation in rapprochement with the US was an economic one. Although Turkey did not get actively engaged with hot conflict, it had to mobilize its army during and also after the war due to above-mentioned Soviet threats. The economic warfare and its implications undermined the national economy and obliged the decision-makers to search for outsider financial support. It was apparent that the only potential supporter at the time was the US due to its financial conditions. The end of WW II represents a concrete distinction where the world splits into two as the Western block led by the US, and partially Britain at one side and the Eastern bloc under Soviet influence at the other. Due to its security-wise and economic concerns, Turkey found its interest in the West where liberal democracy and multi-party systems take priority. Thereby, the decision-maker of Turkey at the time, President Inonu, transited the country to a multi-party regime in 1946 due to his own cost-benefit analysis.

In Turkey's course of contemporary relations with the US, security-wise issues still take priority followed by trading activities. The main dynamics shaping contemporary relations between Turkey and the US are Middle Eastern affairs, particularly

the state of war in Syria and the 15 July 2016 coup-attempt in Turkey, whose suspected leader has been residing in the US since 1999. Consistently, when the course of relations since the WW II are analysed, it is observed that the fundamental issues between the two were mostly based on a security-wise issue. On the other hand, the economic relations have been lasting at a certain level which is relatively low when compared to Turkey's economic activities with EU countries.

Meanwhile, during the DP's first term of 1950-1954, due to the disproportionate rate of imports in the trade balance deficit and relative decrease in growth rates, the course of the economy deteriorated. Although DP leaders resisted the austerity measures recommended by international creditors, ultimately Turkey had to sign a stand-by agreement with the IMF and applied a dramatic devaluation of the Turkish Lira in 1958, which led Turkey to diversify its financial creditors and expand its export volume. Under these circumstances, Turkey applied to the EEC only two weeks after Greece's application. When it comes to contemporary Turkey-EU relations, the main motivation, which is economic, seems to preserve its priority. A Customs Union member since 1996, Turkey's economic relations were built on a strong foundation, whereas in political aspects, full membership negotiations reflect serious disputes. Turkey's trading figures with the EU seem to be in a rising trend while formidable barriers are observed in accession talks. Therewithal, consistent to historical motivations, Turkey's relations with the US essentially lean on security concerns, such as affairs in Middle East and terrorism, while Turkey-EU relations preserve its characteristics of giving priority to economic activities.

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